To Aggregate, Pool, or Neither: Testing the Rational Expectations Hypothesis Using Survey Data by Carl S Bonham & Richard H Cohen
TO AGGREGATE, POOL, OR NEITHER:
TESTING THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
HYPOTHESIS USING SURVEY DATA
by
Carl S. Bonham and Richard H. Cohen
Working Paper No. 00-3R
February 2000To Aggregate, Pool, or Neither: Testing the Rational Expectations
Hypothesis Using Survey Data
Carl S. BONHAM and Richard H. COHEN
It is well known that even if all forecasters are rational, estimated coeﬃ-
cients in unbiasedness regressions using consensus forecasts are inconsistent
because forecasters have private information. However, if all forecasters face
a common realization, pooled estimators are also inconsistent. In contrast,
we show that when predictions and realizations are integrated and cointe-
grated, micro-homogeneity ensures that consensus and pooled estimators are
consistent. Therefore, contrary to claims in the literature, in the absence of
micro-homogeneity, pooling is not a solution to the aggregation problem. We
reject micro-homogeneity for a number of forecasts from the Survey of Pro-
fessional Forecasters. Therefore, for these variables unbiasedness can only be
tested at the individual level.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Survey data have been used extensively in direct tests of the rational expectations hypothesis (REH).
(See Holden, Peel and Thompson (1985), Lovell (1986), or Pesaran (1987) for recent surveys of the
literature on testing the REH.) These data are most commonly used in “consensus” form, i.e., the cross
section of survey responses is averaged to form a single time series prediction. (Some authors have used
other measures of central tendency, such as the median, geometric, or harmonic mean.) Testing the REH
using consensus forecasts has, however, been criticized because aggregation may introduce at least two
kinds of bias. Figlewski and Wachtel (1981, 1983) showed that, since each forecaster’s information set
contains some private information (known only to that forecaster), least squares coeﬃcient estimates in
consensus unbiasedness regressions are inconsistent. In addition, Keane and Runkle (1990) argued that
consensus parameters may lead to false acceptance of the unbiasedness hypothesis because averaged
data may conceal individual deviations from rationality. Thus, rationality tests need to be conducted
using disaggregated data.2 February 2000
Rather than estimating individual regressions, Figlewski and Wachtel (1981, 1983) and Keane and
Runkle (1990) advocated pooling all observations to increase degrees of freedom. However, Zarnowitz
(1985) pointed out that when the target variable is constant for all forecasters in a given time period,
correlation between regressor and error results in downward bias of the pooled estimator.
It is important to note that most researchers have implicitly assumed stationary targets and predic-
tions. However, many macroeconomic series are integrated. For cointegrated targets and predictions,
we show that when individual unbiasedness regressions share the same coeﬃcients across forecasters,
i.e., micro-homogeneity exists, both consensus and pooled parameters can be consistently estimated.
Furthermore, if micro-homogeneity does not hold, false acceptance of the unbiasedness hypothesis may
occur in consensus tests, even in the unlikely event that oﬀsetting individual biases allow parameters
to be consistently estimated. Therefore, this paper shows that micro-homogeneity is crucial for both
consensus and pooled tests of the unbiasedness hypothesis.
Section 2.1 describes the two types of bias that arise from improper use of consenus forecasts, and
section 2.2 describes the heterogeneity bias that arises from improper pooling. In section 3. we test
micro-homogeneity in unbiasedness regressions using ﬁve forecast series from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters. We extend Zellner’s (1962a) micro-homogeneity test to the case of Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) estimation and adapt a weighting matrix suggested by Keane and Runkle (1990),
which accounts for the possibility that forecast errors follow moving average processes both for indi-
viduals and across survey respondents. We show that for nearly all forecast series micro-homogeneity
does not hold. At least for these heterogeneous forecasts, unbiasedness should only be tested at the
individual level. In section 4. we conclude and discuss implications for future work.
2. TO AGGREGATE, POOL, OR NEITHER?
“[E]xpectations, since they are informed predictions of future events, are essentially the same as the
predictions of the relevant economic theory” (Muth 1961, p. 316). The rational expectations literature
has generally taken this well-known quote to mean that “subjective expectations of individuals are
exactly the true mathematical conditional expectations implied by the model itself” (Begg 1982, p. 30,
emphasis added). Thus, the representative agent models used by economists are assumed to be both
“true” representations of the data generating process (DGP) for the series in question and knowable
by agents when forming their expectations. In this case, individual-rational expectations will possess
certain optimal properties. For example, such expectations will be unbiased: the unconditional mean ofUniversity of Hawaii Economics Dept Working Paper: No. 00-3R 3
forecast errors will be zero. These expectations will also be eﬃcient: forecast errors will be uncorrelated
with information available to individual i at time t. “In practice, the DGP may well be unknowable
to our limited intellect, important variables may be unobservable, and/or the stochastic mechanism
need not be constant over time” (Hendry, 1993, p. 422). As a result, forecasters will make use of both
public and private information and will likely have diﬀerent opinions regarding the best model (whether
statistical or otherwise) of the true DGP.
Despite the potential diﬃculty in discovering the “true” DGP of any series, the unbiasedness property
of Muthian rationality is often tested in the literature. For instance, individual unbiasedness has been
tested by least squares (LS) estimation of
At+h = αi + βih Pi,t + hεi,t,t =1 ,...,T,( 1 )
where At+h is the actual value of some target series in period t+h,a n dhPi,t is the subjective expectation
of At+h based on individual i’s time t information set, Ωi,t. The null hypothesis of unbiasedness is
H0: αi =0 ,β i = 1, and unbiased forecasts will have mean zero forecast errors, hηi,t = At+h − hPi,t,
which are equivalent to the residuals in (1), hεi,t.
2.1 Should Consensus Forecasts Be Used in Unbiasedness Tests?
While it is possible to test rationality using individual survey forecasts, the literature has generally
used aggregate measures of expectations. Tests of the unbiasedness hypothesis are typically based on
estimation of “consensus” regressions such as
At+h = αc + βch Pc,t + hεc,t,t =1 ,...,T, (2)
where hPc,t = 1
N
 N
i=1 hPi,t, is the consensus prediction, N is the number of respondents in a survey,
and the subscript c is used to denote the consensus prediction, parameters, and residuals.
Joseph Livingston appears to have popularized the term “consensus” as a convenient summary statis-
tic to denote a cross-sectional mean of individual survey forecasts. The American Heritage Dictionary
(1992) deﬁnes consensus as: “1. An opinion or position reached by a group as a whole or by majority
will: The voters’ consensus was that the measure should be adopted. 2. General agreement or accord:
government by consensus.” Deﬁnition 1 is clearly inapplicable since it implies that all survey respon-
dents would submit the same forecast. Deﬁnition 2 is applicable if a given cross section of forecasts is
suﬃciently similar.4 February 2000
However, in their retrospective on the Survey of Professional Forecasters, Zarnowitz and Braun (1992,
pp. 45-46) conclude: “The distributions of the [forecast] error statistics show that there is much disper-
sionacrosstheforecasts...F orecastersdiﬀerinmanyrespectsandsodotheirproducts.Theideathata
close ‘consensus’ persists, i.e., the current matched forecasts are generally all alike, is a popular ﬁction.
The diﬀerentiation of the forecasts usually involves much more than the existence of just a few outliers.”
Thus, the very use of the term consensus forecast is a misnomer. The view that individual forecasts
diﬀer widely is also prominent in the literature on forecast combination. In fact, for combinations of
forecasts to dominate individual predictions, it must be true that individual survey respondents make
use of private information, so that individual forecasts are heterogeneous. (See Clemen (1989) for an
early survey of the combination literature.)
Nevertheless, when surveys of consumer or business expectations ﬁrst became available, researchers
used cross-sectional average forecasts to avoid small sample problems caused by large numbers of non-
responses in individual forecast series. Many authors also used consensus forecasts as proxies for market
expectations in models such as the Fisher hypothesis.
A number of authors have questioned whether consensus forecasts should be used in unbiasedness
tests, due to the possibility that averaging individual forecasts may lead to parameter estimates which
are biased, or at a minimum misleading. (See Figlewski and Wachtel (1981, 1983), Urich and Wachtel
(1984), Keane and Runkle (1990), Batchelor and Dua (1991), Bonham and Cohen (1992), and Ehrbeck
(1992).) Keane and Runkle (1990, p. 717) pointed out two problems with the use of consensus forecasts
in rationality tests.
First, doing so causes serious speciﬁcation bias. If forecasters are rational, their forecasts will diﬀer
only because of diﬀerences in their information sets. The mean of many individual-rational forecasts,
each conditional on a private information set, is not itself a rational forecast conditional on any
particular information set (see Stephen Figlewski and Paul Wachtel 1983). This seemingly minor
issue can produce severe bias.
A second problem with using consensus forecasts is that this approach can maskindividual deviations
from rationality [e.g.] ...some ﬁrms are consistently optimistic about future sales while others are
consistently pessimistic. Averaging expectations, however, can cancel these biases across ﬁrms so that
industry mean expectations show no bias.
Thus, the literature has recognized the general problem of testing a hypothesis about individual
behavior based on an average of potentially heterogeneous individual forecasts. Keane and Runkle’sUniversity of Hawaii Economics Dept Working Paper: No. 00-3R 5
ﬁrst point refers to individual forecasts which are rational yet heterogeneous, because they are based
on individual-speciﬁc information. That is, while heterogeneous forecasts may diﬀer widely over the
cross section of individuals, rationality implies that parameter estimates in the individual unbiasedness
regressions (1) are identical, i.e. micro-homogeneity holds. Figlewski and Wachtel (1983) showed that
such informational heterogeneity can lead to biased coeﬃcient estimates in consensus regressions.
Keane and Runkle’s second point involves individual forecasts which are heterogeneous in the sense
that some irrational forecasters systematically overpredict while others systematically underpredict.
Thus, parameter estimates in (1) will diﬀer, i.e. micro-homogeneity does not hold. Keane and Runkle’s
concern is that the parameters in consensus regressions may lead to false conclusions about individual
behavior. The following sections treat these two problems in more detail.
Heterogeneous Rational Forecasts.
Figlewski and Wachtel (1983) showed that individuals making rational forecasts, based on public
and private information, will have diﬀerent forecasts. These individual-rational forecasts would pass a
test of unbiasedness based on estimation of equation (1). However, because each forecaster cannot use
the private information of other individuals, Figlewski and Wachtel (1983) argued that the consensus
forecast is correlated with the consensus forecast error and therefore is not rational. (See also Pesaran
(1987) and Batchelor and Dua (1991).) For example, suppose that realizations are generated by the





tω + υt,t =1 ,...,T, (3)
where X
 







vector of individual-speciﬁc information set variables, and υt ∼ iid[0,σ2
υ]. Here we follow Figlewski and
Wachtel (1983) and assume that each individual forms rational predictions of At+h, in the sense that he
knows the structure and parameters of the DGP in (3) yet does not know any of the other forecasters’
private information. In the next section, we relax this stringent assumption and allow for heterogenous
forecasts that are based on individual models which diﬀer systematically from the true DGP. Rational












j,t ωj + υt,i =1 ,...,N, (5)6 February 2000
where we have dropped the subscript h on predictions and forecast errors for ease of exposition. Figlewski
and Wachtel (1983) assumed that E[Zt]=E[Z
 
i,t−ρZj,t]=E[υtXt]=E[υtZt]=0 ∀i  = j,t,ρ, implying
that the individual forecast errors in (5) are mean zero, serially and cross-sectionally uncorrelated, and
uncorrelated with the individual predictions, Pi,t. Therefore, from estimation of equation (1), plim ˆ αi =
αi =0 ,plim ˆ βi = βi =1 ,∀i (i.e., micro-homogeneity holds), and the residuals are equal to the rational
forecast errors, that is, εi,t = ηi,t.














i,t ωi + υt. (7)
In contrast to the individual prediction errors, the presence of private information variables in the
consensus forecast error sets up a correlation with the consensus forecast. As noted in Figlewski and
Wachtel (1983), this correlation would lead to biased parameter estimates in the consensus regression
(2). We refer to this bias as private information bias (hereafter, PIB).
Figlewski and Wachtel (1983) implicitly assumed stationarity in their proof of PIB. Yet, many eco-
nomic time series are well described by integrated processes (see Nelson and Plosser (1982)), and much
of the literature has tested the unbiasedness property of nonstationary forecasts. In the case of rational
forecasts of nonstationary realizations, PIB does not occur. To see this, assume that the public infor-








1,t ∼ I(1) is 1 × d1, X
 
2,t ∼ I(0) is 1 × d2,
and d1 + d2 = d. In addition, assume that E[X2,t]=µ  = 0, while Zt ∼ I(0). Under these assumptions,
At+h ∼ I(1), while At+h and X
 
t cointegrate with cointegrating vector γ.
Note that our ﬁrst assumption, that private information is stationary, could be relaxed. Individual Zj,t
vectors (not available to individual i) could include lagged individual forecasts (which are nonstationary)
so long as Z
 
j,t ωj is stationary. For instance, write Z
 
j,t =[ Pj,t−1,P j,t−2,η j,t−1,η j,t−2,...]a n dω 
j =
[ωj1, −ωj1,ω j3,ω j4, ..., ω jm]. Thus, the integrated private information of individual j enters the
DGP and individual i s forecast error as a stationary forecast revision, ωj1(Pj,t−1 − Pj,t−2).
Because Zt is mean zero, stationary and serially and cross-sectionally independent, so too are the indi-
vidual and consensus forecast errors. Also, they are asymptotically uncorrelated with the I(1) individual
and consensus predictions. Therefore, for rational forecasts of integrated realizations, LS estimates ofUniversity of Hawaii Economics Dept Working Paper: No. 00-3R 7
unbiasedness parameters are super-consistent, even in the presence of omitted stationary variables. That
is, estimates converge to their true values at rate T as opposed to the conventional
√
T (Stock, 1987).
We conclude that plim ˆ αi = αi =0 ,plim ˆ βi = βi =1∀i (i.e., micro-homogeneity holds). Similarly,
from estimation of the consensus regression (2), plim ˆ αc = αc =0 ,plim ˆ βc = βc = 1. This contrasts
with the stationary case, where aggregation of rational forecasts based on heterogeneous private infor-
mation results in PIB. It follows that Keane and Runkle’s (1990) ﬁrst objection to testing unbiasedness
using consensus forecasts is obviated when agents form rational predictions of an integrated target.
Unfortunately, this same conclusion does not hold for Keane and Runkle’s (1990) second point.
Heterogeneous Irrational Forecasts
The second problem referred to by Keane and Runkle (1990) is that aggregation may mask systematic
individual diﬀerences. In fact, given the complex, potentially changing nature of any DGP, it is likely
that agents will diﬀer in their choice of both public and private information set variables and in how
eﬃciently they process the information in these variables. As a result, some agents are likely to produce
forecasts which do not satisfy the optimality conditions of the REH. To see this, assume that agents
use the following prediction rule in place of the rational forecast equation (4):
Pi,t = X
 
t ˜ γi + Z
 
i,t ωi. (8)








,w h e r e∆ i is a d×d diagonal matrix with positive, negative,
or zero diagonal elements. ∆1iγ1 is the parameter vector for the d1 integrated public information
variables (X1t), and ∆2iγ2 is the parameter vector for the d2 stationary public information variables
(X2t). Therefore, (I − ∆i)γ contains individual i’s parameter biases. These biases may arise from
diﬀerences in eﬀort or ability of forecasters to identify a “good” statistical approximation of the DGP,
diﬀerences of opinion as to the best approximation, or because of diﬀerences in the behavior of forecasters
facing unforseeable changes in the DGP.
Under this irrational prediction rule, individual forecast errors may be written as
ηi,t = X
 






j,t ωj + υt. (9)
As long as some element of ∆1i or ∆2i is diﬀerent from one, individual forecast errors are no longer
mean zero, serially uncorrelated and orthogonal to individual predictions, Pi,t. In particular, if some8 February 2000
element of ∆1i diﬀers from unity, the forecast errors in (9) will contain an I(1) component X
 
1t(Id1 −
∆1i)γ1,w h e r eId1 is a d1 × d1 identity matrix; in general, the residuals from equation (1), εi,t, will
also contain the I(1) component X
 
1t(Id1 −βi∆1i)γ1. Thus, individual unbiasedness parameter estimates
are inconsistent since (1) is a spurious regression. On the other hand, if ∆1i = Id1,s ot h a tt r u e
parameters are used for each of the I(1) public information variables, then the residuals from estimation
of equation (1) are I(0), and parameter estimates are super-consistent. In fact, plim ˆ βi = 1, while
plim ˆ αi =[ E[X
 
2t](Id2 − ∆2i)γ2]. Thus, the forecasts contain only an additive bias term, since they are
cointegrated with the realizations. Furthermore, unlike the case of rational forecasts based on private
information sets, when individuals form biased forecasts that are systematically diﬀerent, i.e., ∆i  =∆ j,
micro-homogeneity will generally not hold. Finally, note that allowing for bias in the ωi parameters is
unnecessary. Once we have relaxed the assumption of rationality, relaxing our assumptions regarding
private information does not add to the analysis.
When individuals form irrational forecasts based on the prediction rule in equation (8), the consensus
forecast is given by
Pc,t = X
 







where ¯ ∆= 1
N
 N
i=1∆i. The consensus forecast error may be written
ηc,t = X
 






i,t ωi + υt. (11)
Parallel to our analysis of individual forecast errors, as long as some element of ¯ ∆1i or ¯ ∆2i is diﬀerent
from unity, the consensus forecast error is no longer mean zero, serially uncorrelated, and orthogonal
to the consensus forecast. When some of the elements of ¯ ∆1 diﬀer from one, the consensus forecast
errors in (11) and consensus residuals from estimation of (2) are integrated, and therefore plim ˆ αc  = αc,
and plim ˆ βc  = βc (Bonham and Cohen (1999) point out a simplistic exception to these conclusions.
If parameter biases (or average parameter biases in the consensus case) are identical across all I(1)
public information variables, then individual and consensus regressions cointegrate, while individual
and consensus forecast errors remain I(1).)
Keane and Runkle’s example of systematic over- or under-predictions implies individual forecasts
which are biased as well as heterogeneous. Unlike the heterogeneity of rational forecasts based on private
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micro-homogeneity does not hold. Therefore, conclusions about individual behavior based on consensus
regressions are likely to be misleading even in the unlikely event that the consensus parameters are
consistently estimated. To see this, notice that in equation (11), if ¯ ∆=1 /N
 N
i=1∆i = I, the consensus
forecast error obtained by averaging heterogeneous irrational predictions is equivalent to the unbiased
consensus forecast error in (7) obtained by averaging heterogeneous rational predictions. Thus, the
consensus forecast error and residuals from the consensus unbiasedness regression (2) are I(0) and
consensus parameter estimates are super-consistent, leading to the false conclusion that the forecasters
produce unbiased forecasts. This logical extreme of Keane and Runkle’s second point is demonstrated
in Figure 2.1 for the case of two individuals with stationary forecast errors and exactly oﬀsetting biases,
i.e., ∆1i =∆ 1j = Id1,a n d∆ 2i = diag(2) − ∆2j. For this example, the ∆i average to unity, so the
consensus forecast is unbiased even though each forecaster produces diﬀerent biased forecasts.
The literature on forecast combination has long recognized that consensus forecasts are generally
more accurate than individual forecasts, both because aggregation combines the private and public
information used by forecasters, expanding the consensus information set, and because the consensus
may average out individual forecast errors produced by the various “mispeciﬁed” models. However, the10 February 2000
increased accuracy of consensus forecasts does not imply that consensus regressions should be used to
evaluate the rationality of individual forecasts.
Because micro-homogeneity always holds if all forecasters are rational and always fails when indi-
viduals produce systematically diﬀerent biased forecasts, a test of micro-homogeneity is useful to avoid
both inconsistent consensus parameter estimates and misleading acceptance of the unbiasedness hy-
pothesis. When micro-homogeneity does not hold, it is meaningless to interpret consensus regressions
as informative about the rationality of such heterogeneous individual forecasts.
Theil (1954) studied the properties of aggregated regressions in general. Because he was not concerned
with the information problems unique to testing the rational expectations hypothesis, he simply assumed
that both consensus and individual parameters could be estimated consistently. He deﬁned aggregation
bias as the diﬀerence between the mathematical expectation of the macro (consensus) coeﬃcient and
the average of the “corresponding” micro coeﬃcients. He showed that coeﬃcients in macro (consensus)
relationships will generally depend on complicated combinations of corresponding and noncorrespond-
ing micro coeﬃcients. For instance, αc in equation (2) will be a function of not only the individual αi,
but also a weighted average of the βi, while βc will be a weighted average of the βi. Therefore, what he
meant by aggregation bias was that individual behavioral parameters generally could not be mapped
to a single corresponding macro parameter. Theil showed that a suﬃcient condition for perfect linear
aggregation is the equality of all individual coeﬃcient vectors, i.e., micro-homogeneity. The restrictive-
ness of this suﬃcient condition led Theil to conclude that macro parameters are not useful in studying
micro behavior. He was so disturbed by this result that he wondered whether we should “abolish these
[macro] models altogether” (Theil 1954, p. 180). Thus, while Theil assumed consistency of consensus
and individual parameters estimates and used micro-homogeneity as a condition for economic inter-
pretation, we use micro-homogeneity as a pretest both for consistent estimation and valid hypothesis
testing.
In summary, individual-rational predictions, based on both public and private information, will diﬀer
due to heterogeneous information. For stationary survey forecasts of stationary realizations, although
micro-homogeneity holds, informational heterogeneity leads to PIB. However, for integrated survey
forecasts which are cointegrated with realizations, parameter estimates in consensus regressions are
super-consistent. It follows that consensus regressions do not suﬀer from PIB, and consensus forecasts
can be used in unbiasedness tests. This obviates Keane and Runkle’s ﬁrst concern. In contrast, when
micro-homogeneity does not hold, consensus parameter estimates are generally inconsistent. In theUniversity of Hawaii Economics Dept Working Paper: No. 00-3R 11
extreme version of Keane and Runkle’s second point, where individual forecast biases are oﬀsetting,
consensus parameters are consistently estimated, yet consensus unbiasedness tests lead to misleading
acceptance of the unbiasedness hypothesis. It follows that Keane and Runkle’s second concern about
the use of consensus forecasts holds even under integration. Thus, micro-homogeneity serves as a useful
pretest to avoid both inconsistent consensus parameter estimates and false acceptance of the unbiased-
ness hypothesis.
2.2 Is Pooling a Valid Alternative to Consensus Unbiasedness Tests?
The above-mentioned problems with consensus tests of the REH have led a number of authors to argue
that researchers should use disaggregated data, either in pooled cross-section time-series regressions or
in individual regressions (Figlewski and Wachtel 1981, 1983; Urich and Wachtel 1984; Keane and Runkle
1990; Batchelor and Dua 1991; Ehrbeck 1992).
Most authors appear to prefer pooling over individual regressions for reasons of increased degrees of
freedom and possibly enhanced interpretability of estimated coeﬃcients. The former rationale is espe-
cially compelling for surveys such as the SPF, in which individuals’ forecasts frequently suﬀer from short
time spans and typically contain large numbers of missing observations. (Recall that this consideration
was also mentioned in Section (2.1) in connection with the alleged beneﬁts of using consensus data.)
Unfortunately, the cross-sectional observations in a forecast panel are not necessarily independent, so
the eﬀective number of degrees of freedom may be less than the number of observations minus the
number of parameters. Therefore, the extent to which pooling increases the power of rationality tests
is not obvious (Keane and Runkle, 1990).
Moreover, for stationary realizations and predictions, Zarnowitz (1985) argued that the pooled speci-
ﬁcation is invalid because parameter estimates are biased. To analyze Zarnowitz’s critique, consider the
pooled regression
At+h = αp + βpPi,t + εpi,t,i =1 ,...,N;t =1 ,...,T, (12)
where a p denotes parameters or residuals from the pooled regression. Because each individual shares
the same dependent variable, there is a cross-sectional dependence between Pi,t and εpi,t. For instance,
for a given period, say t = τ,i fPi,τ is one unit greater than Pj,τ,t h e nεpi,τ must be βp×1 unit less than
εpj,τ, implying a correlation coeﬃcient of minus one between forecast and error. Intuitively, individuals
with unusually high forecasts have negative forecast errors and, therefore, negative regression residuals.12 February 2000
Since cov(Pi,τ,ε pi,τ) < 0 (taken over i), summing these cross-sectional covariances over all t implies
that, cov(Pi,t,ε pi,t) < 0. Given the assumption of stationary realizations and predictions, var(Pi,t)i sa
positive constant. Hence the last term in




is negative, and the estimate of βp will be biased downward.
This apparently straightforward result is disputed by Keane and Runkle (1990, p. 721), who claim
that Zarnowitz (1985) has not recognized that the pooled time-series cross-section regressions are
√
T
consistent. Although they cite Chamberlain (1984) in support of their argument, his asymptotic analysis
does not address the eﬀect of a constant within-period dependent variable on consistency of ˆ βp.T h e
reasoning in the previous paragraph holds no matter how large T is: cov(Pi,t,ε pi,t) is the average of T
cross-sectional covariances, each of which is negative.
We conclude that for stationary realizations and predictions pooled coeﬃcients are inconsistent due
to the constant cross-sectional realization. Furthermore, this result applies even if micro-homogeneity
holds. Therefore, rationality tests must be conducted using either separate individual regressions or a
seemingly unrelated system whose variance-covariance matrix incorporates an appropriate cross-section-
time-series error structure. Finally, note that Zarnowitz’s critique does not apply if unbiasedness tests
are conducted by regressing forecast errors on a constant. This formulation requires the maintained
hypothesis that βp = βi =1 ,∀i. In contrast, individual tests using (1) allow researchers to test this
restriction.
Next, we examine whether the pooled estimator is still inconsistent when the target and prediction
are integrated and cointegrated. Review of the calculation of cov(Pi,t,ε pi,t) shows that the negative
cross-sectional covariances remain when Pi,t is nonstationary for all i =1 ,...,N. Hence, assuming
stationary pooled residuals, the numerator of the bias term in (13) is the covariance of integrated
forecasts and stationary residuals, while the denominator is the variance of the integrated forecasts.
Thus, the numerator is O(1), while the denominator is O(T). This implies that the biasing eﬀect of
the constant realization on βp vanishes as T approaches inﬁnity, for given N. Therefore, Zarnowitz’s
critique of pooling applies only for the case of a stationary target.
In summary, for integrated and cointegrated predictions and realizations, PIB does not lead to incon-
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pooled parameter estimates. Furthermore, parameter estimates in both consensus and pooled speciﬁca-
tions are asymptotically equivalent (see Appendix A).
However,there remains another potential source of inconsistency of pooled estimators:micro-heterogeneity.
For example, Pesaran and Smith (1995) conclude that when micro-homogeneity fails, the pooled re-
gression is spurious, and therefore the pooled coeﬃcients are inconsistent. (This result holds even if the
realizations diﬀer over the cross section.) To see this, assume that αi =0a n dβi represent the cointe-
grating parameter in each individual regression. Let each individual’s βi diﬀer from the common pooled
coeﬃcient, βp, by a random variable φi, i.e., βp = βi + φi,w h e r eφi ∼ iid(0,σ2
φ). In this case, we can
write the relationship between an individual unbiasedness regression and the corresponding individual
element in the pooled regression as
At+h = βiPi,t + εi,t,
=( βp − φi)Pi,t + εi,t,
= βpPi,t +( εi,t − φiPi,t),
= βpPi,t + εpi,t. (14)
Under these assumptions, the residual, εpi,t, contains two components. The ﬁrst, the residual from
the individual unbiasedness regression, εi,t, is stationary by assumption, while the second, φiPi,t,i s
integrated by assumption. Hence the pooled regression does not cointegrate, and the pooled estimator
is inconsistent. (See Phillips and Moon (1997, p. 25) for a counter example which requires that individual
regressors and errors are each independently distributed over the cross section.)
So far we have seen that pooling stationary data leads to inconsistent parameter estimates due
to a constant realization in each cross section. Recall that this conclusions does not depend on the
heterogeneity of individual unbiasedness parameters. While pooling integrated and cointegrated series
avoids the constant realization problem, micro-heterogeneity of slope parameters leads to a spurious
pooled regression. In fact, under micro-heterogeneity, the pooled regression is misspeciﬁed, resulting in a
more general type of inconsistency referred to as heterogeneity bias. Heterogeneity bias may occur even
in stationary pooled regressions without constant realizations, or in nonstationary pooled regressions
when cross-sectional independence of regressors and residuals allow for consistent estimates (Phillips
and Moon, 1997, p. 26). In this more general context, Hsiao (1986, p. 5-8) illustrated several cases in
which “a straightforward pooling of all NT observations, assuming identical parameters for all cross-14 February 2000
section units, would lead to nonsensical results, because it would represent an average of coeﬃcients
that diﬀer greatly across individuals.”
By pooling individual unbiasedness regressions, researchers implicitly assume that no diﬀerences
exist in the individual forecasters’ parameters, as could be allowed for via ﬁxed or random eﬀects. If
this “representative agent” assumption fails, least squares parameter estimates from the misspeciﬁed
pooled regression will necessarily diverge from the correctly speciﬁed individual regressions.
Recall that Keane and Runkle’s second critique of aggregating individual forecasts is that individual
biases are obscured to the degree that they are oﬀsetting. Thus, consensus tests may incorrectly fail to
reject the null of unbiasedness. Keane and Runkle suggest that pooling avoids the problem of oﬀsetting
biases. However, as shown in Section 2.1, Keane and Runkle’s example implies that parameters in in-
dividual unbiasedness regressions will diﬀer across survey respondents. This micro-heterogeneity causes
heterogeneity bias, and therefore pooling is not a solution to the problem of aggregation bias.
For example, assume that in equation (1), individual 1, who underpredicts, has coeﬃcients α1 > 0,
β1 = 1, and individual 2, who overpredicts, has α2 < 0, β2 =1 .T h e nF i g u r e2 . 1c a nb er e u s e di fw e
relabel the “Consensus Regression Line” as the “Pooled Regression Line.” (Recall that this result holds
asymptotically.) The pooled (or consensus) coeﬃcients would clearly lead to nonrejection of the unbi-
asedness hypothesis, although each individual produces biased forecasts. Other examples of improper
pooling could be illustrated. For instance, when α∗
1 < 0, α∗
2 > 0, β∗
1 > 1.0, β∗
2 < 1.0, individual slopes
also diﬀer, and as shown above, the pooled regression does not cointegrate.
In all of these examples, the clear implication is that pooling should not be undertaken without
ﬁrst testing for micro-homogeneity. This important point applies to panel data analysis in general and
may not be widely recognized. At least some popular econometrics texts do not explicitly mention the
need for testing micro-homogeneity before pooling. (See, for example, Judge (1988) and Johnston and
Dinardo (1997).) Zellner (1962a) showed that it is possible to test the hypothesis that coeﬃcient vectors
are all the same. He recommended performing such tests whenever possible to place the interpretation of
coeﬃcient estimates on “ﬁrm ground” (Zellner 1962b, p. 117). Next, we conduct such tests as pre-tests
for both aggregation and pooling.University of Hawaii Economics Dept Working Paper: No. 00-3R 15
3. TESTING MICRO-HOMOGENEITY IN SPF UNBIASEDNESS REGRESSIONS
We know of three studies which test for poolability in a REH context. Pearce (1984) used individual
Livingston Survey forecasts of the Standard and Poor’s stock price index. He rejected unbiasedness
using both pooled and individual regressions over a variety of samples classiﬁed by time period, forecast
horizon, and professional aﬃliation. In particular, he rejected individual unbiasedness using a subsample
of twelve forecasters (out of a maximum of 60 respondents for any given forecast period) who responded
regularly over an eight-year period. He noted that for this subsample, micro-homogeneity is rejected
in a SUR system. Urich and Wachtel (1984) applied analysis of variance tests for poolability in both
unbiasedness and eﬃciency regressions involving forecasts of changes in the money supply. Although
they explicitly noted that aggregation bias rendered the consensus coeﬃcients inconsistent, they did not
address the heterogeneity bias in the pooled speciﬁcation. They interpreted their rejections of pooling
as conveying information about the incremental explanatory power of the disaggregated system, i.e.,
eﬃciency, rather than the heterogeneity bias in the pooled regression. More recently, Batchelor and
Dua (1991) rejected poolability of real GNP and GNP deﬂator forecasts (among others) from the Blue
Chip Economic Indicators forecasting service. They also noted that using individual regressions avoids
“biases due to the use of averaged or pooled data” (Batchelor and Dua 1991, p. 692).
None of the studies cited above incorporated any correction for cross correlation of disturbances.
Urich and Wachtel’s (1984) variance-covariance matrix includes only a correction for time-dependent
heteroscedasticity. In contrast, Batchelor and Dua (1991) correct only for individual forecaster horizon-
dependent heteroscedasticity and serial correlation inherent in forecasts with a ﬁxed target date and
therefore a successively shorter forecast horizon. In appendix B, we extend Zellner’s (1962a) Seemingly
Unrelated Regression (SUR) test of micro-homogeneity to adapt a GMM covariance structure developed
by Keane and Runkle (1990), which accounts for individual moving average errors and the possibility of
contemporaneous and lagged dependencies across respondents’ forecast errors. Such dependencies are
likely to arise in the presence of information lags and aggregate shocks to the forecast target series.
Below we conduct micro-homogeneity tests for coeﬃcients in unbiasedness regressions. We consider
a subset of the forecasts available in the Survey of Professional Forecasters for the period from 1968:4
to 1997:4. (See Zarnowitz (1985), Zarnowitz and Braun (1992), and Croushore (1993) for descriptions
of the SPF.) Speciﬁcally, we test micro-homogeneity using zero-, one-, and four-quarter-ahead forecasts
of nominal GDP, the GDP deﬂator, real GDP, real consumption expenditures, and real nonresidential16 February 2000
investment. Referring to the current survey period as quarter t, survey respondents submit forecasts for
quarters t+h,h =0 ,1,...,4. The most recent quarter for which data is available when respondents form
their predictions is quarter t−1− ,w h e r e  is the publication lag, i.e., the length of time between the
realization of the target series and the publication of that series by the Department of Commerce. When
forming forecasts for quarter t + h, forecasters know their own errors for quarter t − 1 −   and earlier.
Hence, rational h-step-ahead forecast errors may follow a moving average process of order k =   + h,
and our GMM weighting matrix described in appendix B allows for a k-period memory. (See equations
(B.2) and (B.3).) In this study, the publication lag,  , is equal to one quarter.
To test the REH or micro-homogeneity in the context of unbiasedness or eﬃciency regressions, it
is necessary to specify both what survey respondents are trying to predict and what information is
available to individuals when they form their forecasts. To insure that our time series of realizations
have not been subject to unforecastable data revisions, we follow Keane and Runkle (1990), who argue
that survey respondents are forecasting the realization reported by the Department of Commerce in its
preliminary release, approximately 45 days after the end of the quarter. We collected these data from
back issues of the Survey of Current Business. We exclude from our analysis all forecasts that extend
beyond the date at which (potentially unforecastable) major benchmark (e.g., deﬁnitional) changes
occurred. These benchmark changes occurred in 1975:4, 1980:4, 1985:4, 1991:3 and 1995:4. Because of
publication lag, we delete the   = 1 quarter following each major benchmark date, and for h-step-ahead
forecasts, we exclude the h forecasts preceding the benchmark date.
In contrast to Keane and Runkle (1990), we do not delete the forecasts made for the annual benchmark
quarters. Although the annual revisions do make use of data that was unavailable when the preliminary
release is made, these revisions do not involve encompassing methodological or deﬁnitional changes,
which are inherently unforecastable. Rather, Keane and Runkle (1990, p. 723) refer to these data
revisions as “systematic.” Note that deleting forecasts made in each annual benchmark revision quarter
and the subsequent quarter’s forecast would eliminate at least one half of the respondents forecasts!
(We have conducted full sample micro-homogeneity tests for all ﬁve variables using zero-step-ahead
forecasts, a minimum response level of 20 responses, and excluding both annual and major benchmark
revision dates. We found no qualitative diﬀerences between the results we report in Table 1 and the
results excluding the forecasts aﬀected by annual revisions). We also exclude from our analysis the
quarter (1990:2) in which the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank took over the survey from the NationalUniversity of Hawaii Economics Dept Working Paper: No. 00-3R 17
Bureau of Economic Research. That quarter’s survey was sent to forecasters late in the third quarter
of 1990.
We rebase the realizations and each forecast of the GDP deﬂator, real GDP, consumption, and
nonresidential investment to a single (1958 = 100) base year. (See Bonham and Cohen (1992) for a
discussion of problems with using nonrebased data.) Finally, because individual forecasters responded
to the survey sporadically, a decision must be made regardingthe minimum number of responses required
for a forecast to be included in our tests. We selected only those respondents who made at least twenty
forecasts, not necessarily consecutive.
It is well known that many macroeconomic series are well characterized by integrated processes (see
Nelson and Plosser (1982)). To conduct inference based on regressions containing integrated series,
we rely on the results of West (1988). West showed that standard inference (i.e., conventional normal
asymptotic theory) can be used in cointegrating regressions which can be written in a form containing a
single integrated regressor with drift; any additional regressor must be stationary. We choose ﬁve series
whose ﬁrst (or second) diﬀerences are stationary with a nonzero unconditional mean; we assume that
forecasts of these series share these properties and are cointegrated with the realizations. (See Bonham
and Cohen (1992) for cointegration test results for SPF forecasts of the GDP deﬂator.) Under these
assumptions, individual unbiasedness regressions will meet the conditions of West (1988) and allow for
standard inference in micro-homogeneity tests.
Table 1 presents test results for the null hypothesis of micro-homogeneity for zero-, one-, and four-
quarter-ahead forecasts of nominal GDP, real GDP, the GDP deﬂator, real nonresidential investment,
and real consumption. Micro-homogeneity is rejected at marginal signiﬁcance levels (MSL) of approx-
imately 1% or less for all forecast series except the four-quarter-ahead real nonresidential investment
series. The marginal signiﬁcance level for the micro-homogeneity test on the latter series is 0.08. It is
interesting to note that in this case the rate of rejection of individual unbiasedness, reported in column
four of Table 1, is almost 78%. (For our individual unbiasedness tests we estimate equation (1) using
OLS with a Hansen (1982) type correction for MA(k) errors.) Thus, while micro-homogeneity comes
close to being an acceptable maintained hypothesis for consensus or pooled regressions with this fore-
cast, the explanation appears to be a biased “consensus” in the sense of dictionary deﬁnition 2 (see
page 3). In fact, the individual rejection rates range from a low of almost 24% to a high of nearly 93%.18 February 2000
Table 1. Full Sample Micro-homogeneity Tests
At+h = αi + βi hPi,t + hεi,t, i =1 ,...,N (1)
H0 : α1 = ...= αN,β 1 = ...= βN
12 3 4 5 6
Series χ2 MSL Ind. Rejection Rate N Average R
GDPt+0 272.21 0.00 30.10% 93 35.51
PRICEt+0 377.38 0.00 46.74% 92 35.36
RGDPt+0 175.92 0.00 68.75% 32 32.41
RCONt+0 92.890 0.00 48.28% 29 32.72
RNRESINt+0 93.940 0.00 92.86% 28 33.39
GDPt+1 232.06 0.01 23.66% 93 35.49
PRICEt+1 425.24 0.00 67.39% 92 35.35
RGDPt+1 171.14 0.00 65.63% 32 32.41
RCONt+1 96.660 0.00 65.52% 29 32.69
RNRESINt+1 117.10 0.00 92.86% 28 33.32
GDPt+4 295.93 0.00 35.63% 87 33.68
PRICEt+4 455.81 0.00 75.90% 83 34.08
RGDPt+4 85.310 0.01 63.33% 30 32.37
RCONt+4 136.70 0.00 77.78% 27 32.56
RNRESINt+4 66.910 0.08 77.78% 27 32.70
NOTE: Column 1 gives the target series (dependent variable in equation (1)): GDP, RGDP, and PRICE are nominal Gross Domestic Product
(GNP prior to 1991:3), real GDP, and the GDP deﬂator; RCON and RNRESIN are real consumption expenditures and real nonresidential
investment, respectively. RGDP, RCON, and RNRESIN were not part of the SPF until 1981:3. Column 2 is the value of the Wald test for
H0. Column 3 is the marginal signiﬁcance level of the test in column 2. Column 4 gives the percentage of the individual regression results
which produce a rejection of the null of unbiasedness. Column 5 gives the number of survey respondents who meet our minimum response
level of 20, and Column 6 gives the average number of responses per individual included in the test.
The statistical and economic signiﬁcance of these rejections of micro-homogeneity may need qualiﬁca-
tion due to two characteristics of the data. First, there is typically a large number of missing observations
per forecaster. Unless these missing observations are random, our tests may suﬀer from sample selection
bias. Second, the pool of forecasters shrinks markedly over the sample period. Thus, our results may be
dominated by forecaster performance over the earlier part of the sample period.
In addressing the ﬁrst issue, we rule out interpolation methods for ﬁlling in missing forecasts. Even if
we were to generate predictions of missing forecasts with an iterative method that uses only variables in
the forecaster’s information set, we would still be imposing a speciﬁc forecast generating process on the
individual, then using that pseudo-interpolated data to test his rationality. Clearly, this methodology is
unacceptable. Instead, we investigate whether increasing the minimum response level (MRL) from 20 to
30, 40, and 50 observations produces diﬀerent results. In other words, we eliminate survey respondents
with the largest number of missing observations. Tables 2-6 show the results of varying the minimum
response level for three diﬀerent forecast horizons for each of the ﬁve variables tested in Table 1.
The thirty-eight (full sample) tests in which minimum response levels are raised to 30, 40, and 50
observations produce only nine nonrejections at the 5% level. Three of these are for the zero-quarter-
ahead forecast of nominal GDP and two more are for the one-quarter-ahead forecast of this variable
(see Table 2). Interestingly, the marginal signiﬁcance levels remain at virtually zero for all minimumUniversity of Hawaii Economics Dept Working Paper: No. 00-3R 19
Table 2. Further Micro-homogeneity Tests: Nominal GDP Subsample for Minimum Response Levels
At+h = αi + βi hPi,t + hεi,t, i =1 ,...,N (1)
H0 : α1 = ...= αN,β 1 = ...= βN
123 4 5 6
MRL χ2 MSL Ind. Rejection Rate N Average R
0s t e pa h e a df o r e c a s t
1968:4 - 1997:4
20 272.21 0.00 30.10% 93 35.51
30 98.470 0.30 27.66% 47 45.85
40 66.050 0.34 28.13% 32 51.47
50 27.920 0.26 38.46% 13 63.77
1968:4 - 1989:4
20 323.47 0.00 22.79% 79 34.53
30 96.710 0.20 20.46% 44 42.43
1990:1 - 1997:4
20 59.100 0.02 40.00% 20 25.75
30 6.660 0.04 50.00% 2 31.00
1968:4 - 1979:4
20 242.35 0.00 33.33% 48 29.52
30 130.04 0.00 30.44% 23 35.30
1980:1 - 1997:4
20 108.30 0.00 40.00% 35 32.34
30 24.350 0.23 36.36% 11 48.64
1980:1 - 1989:4
20 161.36 0.00 33.33% 21 26.71
30 11.660 0.47 42.86% 7 33.29
1s t e pa h e a df o r e c a s t
1968:4 - 1997:4
20 232.06 0.01 23.66% 93 35.49
30 107.44 0.13 19.15% 47 45.85
40 75.020 0.12 12.50% 32 51.47
50 41.940 0.01 15.39% 13 63.77
1968:4 - 1989:4
20 251.26 0.00 20.25% 79 34.52
30 106.98 0.06 15.91% 44 42.43
1990:1 - 1997:4
20 72.230 0.00 45.00% 20 25.75
30 10.990 0.00 100.0% 2 31.00
1968:4 - 1979:4
20 249.28 0.00 0.29% 48 29.52
30 146.29 0.00 43.48% 23 35.30
1980:1 - 1997:4
20 132.94 0.00 34.29% 35 32.34
30 36.330 0.01 18.18% 11 48.64
1980:1 - 1989:4
20 88.090 0.00 38.10% 21 26.71
30 12.310 0.42 28.57% 7 33.30
4s t e pa h e a df o r e c a s t
1968:4 - 1997:4
20 295.93 0.00 35.63% 87 33.68
30 138.84 0.00 22.50% 40 44.30
40 114.23 0.00 14.29% 21 52.29
50 39.230 0.00 25.00% 8 64.75
1968:4 - 1989:4
20 338.30 0.00 30.56% 72 32.67
30 218.31 0.00 27.03% 37 40.54
1990:1 - 1997:4
20 85.860 0.00 84.21% 19 25.32
30 NA NA NA 0 NA
1968:4 - 1979:4
20 498.42 0.00 57.14% 42 27.50
30 163.03 0.00 62.50% 16 33.44
1980:1 - 1997:4
20 128.07 0.00 50.00% 32 32.75
30 61.280 0.00 18.18% 11 46.73
1980:1 - 1989:4
20 504.39 0.00 84.21% 19 26.90
30 220.35 0.00 100.0% 7 32.86
NOTE: Column 1 gives the minimum number of responses for each forecaster (over the sample period under consideration) to be included
in the test. Column 2 is the value of the Wald test for H0. Column 3 is the marginal signiﬁcance level of the test in column 2. Column 4
gives the percentage of individual unbiasedness tests which reject the null of unbiasedness. Column 5 gives the size of the cross section, i.e.
the number of individuals who meet the MRL. Column 6 gives the average number of survey responses at each point in time, averaged over
the sample period. NA indicates that there were less than two respondents meeting the Minimum Response Level for this sample.20 February 2000
Table 3. Further Micro-homogeneity Tests: GDP Deﬂator Subsample for Minimum Response Levels
At+h = αi + βi hPi,t + hεi,t, i =1 ,...,N (1)
H0 : α1 = ...= αN,β 1 = ...= βN
123 4 56
MRL χ2 MSL Ind. Rejection Rate N Average R
0s t e pa h e a df o r e c a s t
1968:4 - 1997:4
20 377.38 0.00 46.74% 92 35.36
30 223.67 0.00 41.30% 46 45.98
40 190.49 0.00 43.75% 32 51.03
50 59.680 0.00 50.00% 12 64.33
1968:4 - 1989:4
20 310.45 0.00 37.50% 80 34.2
30 210.40 0.00 41.86% 43 42.72
1990:1 - 1997:4
20 101.51 0.00 88.89% 18 25.44
30 3.160 0.21 50.00% 2 31.00
1968:4 - 1979:4
20 268.25 0.00 34.04% 47 29.6
30 168.47 0.00 50.00% 22 35.5
1980:1 - 1997:4
20 320.27 0.00 56.25% 32 32.8
30 55.910 0.00 36.36% 11 47.3
1980:1 - 1989:4
20 244.26 0.00 25.00% 20 26.9
30 28.390 0.00 28.57% 7 32.9
1s t e pa h e a df o r e c a s t
1968:4-1997:4
20 425.24 0.00 67.39% 92 35.35
30 278.10 0.00 67.39% 46 45.98
40 254.18 0.00 75.00% 32 51.03
50 74.050 0.00 75.00% 12 64.33
1968:4 - 1989:4
20 363.45 0.00 63.75% 80 34.19
30 252.82 0.00 65.12% 43 42.72
1990:1 - 1997:4
20 142.05 0.00 72.22% 18 25.44
30 24.940 0.00 50.00% 2 31.00
1968:4 - 1979:4
20 518.57 0.00 59.57% 47 29.6
30 302.52 0.00 86.36% 22 35.5
1980:1 - 1997:4
20 378.10 0.00 59.38% 32 32.8
30 51.740 0.00 45.46% 11 47.27
1980:1 - 1989:4
20 312.12 0.00 40.00% 20 26.9
30 12.230 0.43 57.14% 7 32.86
4s t e pa h e a df o r e c a s t
1968:4-1997:4
20 455.81 0.00 75.90% 83 34.08
30 218.22 0.00 77.50% 40 44.1
40 83.280 0.00 85.00% 20 52.3
50 49.510 0.00 100.00% 8 64
1968:4 - 1989:4
20 320.57 0.00 75.71% 70 32.97
30 204.29 0.00 72.97% 37 40.62
1990:1 - 1997:4
20 453.10 0.00 56.25% 16 25.31
30 NA NA NA 0 NA
1968:4 - 1979:4
20 5.640 1.00 73.81% 42 27.57
30 1446.3 0.00 81.25% 16 33.5
1980:1 - 1997:4
20 438.32 0.00 76.67% 30 32.80
30 60.490 0.00 72.73% 11 45.27
1980:1 - 1989:4
20 428.54 0.00 77.78% 18 26.94
30 21.380 0.05 85.71% 7 32.43
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Table 4. Further Micro-homogeneity Tests: Real GDP Subsample for Minimum Response Levels
At+h = αi + βi hPi,t + hεi,t, i =1 ,...,N (1)
H0 : α1 = ...= αN,β 1 = ...= βN
123 4 56
MRL χ2 MSL Ind. Rejection Rate N Average R
0s t e pa h e a df o r e c a s t
1981:3 - 1997:4
20 175.92 0.00 68.75% 32 32.41
30 55.38 0.00 63.64% 11 47.45
40 51.61 0.00 70.00% 10 48.4
50 3.04 0.55 100.00% 3 55
1981:3 - 1989:4
20 79.05 0.00 38.89% 18 25.83
30 18.25 0.05 66.67% 6 32.5
1990:1 - 1997:4
20 144.27 0.00 85.00% 20 25.80
30 2.530 0.28 100.0% 2 31.00
1s t e pa h e a df o r e c a s t
1981:3-1997:4
20 171.14 0.00 65.63% 32 32.41
30 68.89 0.00 36.36% 11 47.45
40 59.61 0.00 40.00% 10 48.4
50 7.79 0.10 100.00% 3 55
1981:3 - 1989:4
20 95.23 0.00 44.44% 18 25.83
30 15.94 0.10 83.33% 6 32.5
1990:1 - 1997:4
20 162.06 0.00 95.00% 20 25.80
30 5.620 0.06 100.0% 2 31.00
4s t e pa h e a df o r e c a s t
1981:3-1997:4
20 85.31 0.01 63.33% 30 32.37
30 54.66 0.00 18.18% 11 45.36
40 44.25 0.00 20.00% 10 46.1
50 NA NA NA 1 NA
1981:3 - 1989:4
20 92.97 0.00 93.75% 16 25.88
30 61.26 0.00 100.00% 6 32
1990:1 - 1997:4
20 93.580 0.00 94.74% 19 25.37
30 NA NA NA 0 NA
NOTE: See Table 2 for descriptions.22 February 2000
Table 5. Further Micro-homogeneity Tests: Real Consumption Subsample for Minimum Response Levels
At+h = αi + βi hPi,t + hεi,t, i =1 ,...,N (1)
H0 : α1 = ...= αN,β 1 = ...= βN
123 4 56
MRL χ2 MSL Ind. Rejection Rate N Average R
0s t e pa h e a df o r e c a s t
1981:3 - 1997:4
20 92.890 0.00 48.28% 29 32.72
30 26.810 0.14 45.46% 11 46.09
40 19.590 0.24 44.44% 9 47.89
50 NA NA NA 0 NA
1981:3 - 1989:4
20 63.680 0.00 28.57% 14 26.36
30 18.450 0.02 60.00% 5 32.2
1990:1 - 1997:4
20 115.07 0.00 57.90% 19 25.74
30 9.940 0.01 100.0% 2 31.00
1s t e pa h e a df o r e c a s t
1981:3-1997:4
20 96.660 0.00 65.52% 29 32.69
30 38.410 0.01 45.46% 11 46.09
40 30.130 0.02 44.44% 9 47.89
50 NA NA NA 0 NA
1981:3 - 1989:4
20 27.690 0.37 57.14% 14 26.29
30 9.1600 0.33 80.00% 5 32.4
1990:1 - 1997:4
20 167.56 0.00 84.21% 19 25.74
30 7.700 0.02 100.0% 2 31.00
4s t e pa h e a df o r e c a s t
1981:3-1997:4
20 136.70 0.00 77.78% 27 32.56
30 61.630 0.00 54.55% 11 43.82
40 51.900 0.00 62.50% 8 46
50 NA NA NA 0 NA
1981:3 - 1989:4
20 90.340 0.00 75.00% 12 26.5
30 62.530 0.00 100.00% 4 32.75
1990:1 - 1997:4
20 103.16 0.00 94.44% 18 25.2
30 NA NA NA 0 NA
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Table 6. Further Micro-homogeneity Tests: Real Nonresidential Investment Subsample for Minimum Response Levels
At+h = αi + βi hPi,t + hεi,t, i =1 ,...,N (1)
H0 : α1 = ...= αN,β 1 = ...= βN
123 4 56
MRL χ2 MSL Ind. Rejection Rate N Average R
0s t e pa h e a df o r e c a s t
1981:3 - 1997:4
20 93.94 0.00 92.86% 28 33.39
30 43.05 0.00 81.82% 11 46.55
40 40.58 0.00 80.00% 10 47.4
50 NA NA NA 0 NA
1981:3 - 1989:4
20 34.75 0.12 85.71% 14 26.5
30 17.43 0.03 100.00% 5 32.6
1990:1 - 1997:4
20 67.710 0.00 94.74% 19 25.80
30 10.100 0.01 100.0% 2 31.00
1s t e pa h e a df o r e c a s t
1981:3 -1997:4
20 117.1 0.00 92.86% 28 33.32
30 60.02 0.00 81.82% 11 46.45
40 56.67 0.00 80.00% 10 47.3
50 NA NA NA 0 NA
1981:3 - 1989:4
20 58.32 0.00 92.86% 14 26.43
30 28.83 0.00 100.0% 5 32.6
1990:1 - 1997:4
20 105.96 0.00 100% 19 25.74
30 9.040 0.01 100.0% 2 31.00
4s t e pa h e a df o r e c a s t
1981:3-1997:4
20 66.91 0.08 77.78% 27 32.7
30 36.87 0.01 63.64% 11 44.09
40 33.68 0.01 70.00% 10 44.7
50 NA NA NA 0 NA
1981:3 - 1989:4
20 18.23 0.79 61.54% 13 26
30 8.22 0.41 60.00% 5 32
1990:1 - 1997:4
20 59.220 0.01 100.0% 18 25.28
30 NA NA NA 0 NA
NOTE: See Table 2 for descriptions.24 February 2000
response levels for the zero- and one-quarter-ahead forecast of the GDP deﬂator reported in Table 3.
MSLs rise to nonrejection levels only for the 50 response level for real GDP in Table 4, where the
number of respondents drops to only three. Thus, when there is a response level of 30 or more, there
is less evidence against micro-homogeneity for forecasts of nominal GDP than for the deﬂator or real
GDP.
One possible explanation of these results is that forecasts of nominal GDP are more uniformly un-
biased than forecasts of either component factor, due to oﬀsetting forecast errors in each factor. This
conjecture is borne out by results of the individual unbiasedness tests. With a minimum response level
of 30 or more, the percentage of rejections reported in column four ranges from 28% to 38% for zero-
quarter-ahead nominal GDP (Table 2), 41% to 50% for the zero-quarter-ahead deﬂator (Table 3), and
64% to 100% for zero-quarter-ahead real GDP (Table 4). This pattern is also present in the other
forecast horizons of these variables.
To summarize our ﬁndings on the eﬀect of missing observations, we conclude that, except for short
horizon forecasts of nominal GDP, eliminating forecasters who respond less frequently does not result
in a more homogeneous sample of forecasts or an increase in nonrejection of micro-homogeneity tests.
The second possible drawback to the use of the Survey of Professional Forecasters’ data is that
the cross-sectional dimension of the survey has shrunk steadily since the survey began in 1968:4. The
shrinking number of survey responses combined with individual missing observations can result in a
very small number of observations at any given point in time near the end of the sample period. Figure
3.1 below illustrates the size of the cross section for the one-quarter-ahead deﬂator forecast at each
point in time from 1968:4 to 1997:4. The cross section is counted after ﬁrst excluding individuals who
do not meet the minimum response levels 20, 30, 40, and 50 forecasts over the entire sample period.
Are our test results driven by a disproportionate number of observations in the earlier part of the
sample period? First, note that the higher we set the minimum response level, the smaller the decline
in eligible forecasters over time. Thus, increasing the minimum response level serves two purposes: it
not only reduces the number of missing observations per forecaster, but also signiﬁcantly attenuates
the decline in the total number of forecasters over the sample period.
To investigate any remaining eﬀects of the decline in the number of eligible forecasters on our test
results, we begin by determining the dates at which the number of survey respondents falls below various
thresholds, assuming a minimum response level of 20. The number of eligible survey respondents falls








Figure 3.1: Cross-Sectional Sample Size
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the break points for our subsample tests of nominal GDP and the deﬂator. For these variables, we
conduct tests for all possible subsamples: 1968:4-1989:4, 1990:1-1997:4, 1968:4-1979:4, 1980:1-1997:4,
and 1980:1-1989:4. For forecasts of real GDP, consumption, and nonresidential investment, which were
introduced in the survey in 1981:3, we conduct subsample tests for 1981:3-1989:4 and 1990:1-1997:4.
The results are presented in Tables 2-6.
Full sample testing over all variables, horizons, and minimum response levels produces forty-three
rejections and ten nonrejections. In general, the nonrejections appear to be associated with shorter
forecast horizons, possibly more forecast experience (i.e., a higher minimum response level), and the
decade of the 1980s. Recall that, in the full sample, the variables producing the most nonrejections of
micro-homogeneity are nominal GDP at zero and one-quarter-ahead horizons, for minimum response
levels of 30, 40 and 50. Subsample tests for zero-step-ahead nominal GDP forecasts produce nonrejec-
tions (for a minimum response level of 30) in all periods except the earliest (1968:4-1979:4). For the
one-step-ahead forecast of nominal GDP, rejections occur in the 1980:1-1997:4 subperiod as well as the
earliest subperiod.
Of the forty-three full sample rejections, twenty-six also satisfy minimum response levels of 20 or 30
in at least some subsamples. For these variables, we examine robustness of the full-sample rejections by
conducting tests on these eligible subsamples. The 77 subsample tests produce only ten nonrejections.
Interestingly, six out of the ten nonrejections are for the decade of the 1980s; the 1990:1-1997:4subperiod
produces three nonrejections and twenty-two rejections. Each of the three nonrejections has an eligible26 February 2000
cross section of only two forecasters. Thus, full sample rejections of micro-homogeneity do not appear
to be an artifact of the overall decline in the number of forecasters in the 1990s. Therefore, once we
specify a minimum response level, the nonrejections of micro-homogeneity for the full sample appear to
occur in spite of, not because of, the steady decline in eligible forecasters over time.
In addition to our tests of the micro-homogeneity hypothesis, the fourth column of each table reports
the percentage of individual unbiasedness tests which reject at the 5% level. We ﬁnd widespread rejection
of the unbiasedness hypothesis at the individual level. For the full sample results reported in Table 1, the
percentage of rejections range from a low of 23.7% for one-step-ahead nominal GDP forecasts to a high of
92.9% for zero- and one-step-ahead real nonresidential investment forecasts. Our ﬁndings are consistent
with the results of other researchers. For forecasts of changes in the GDP deﬂator, Zarnowitz (1985)
rejected the unbiasedness hypothesis (at the 5% level) in over 26% of the contemporaneous forecasts,
more than 46% of the one-quarter-ahead forecasts, and 58% of the four-quarter-ahead forecasts. For
contemporaneous, one-quarter-ahead, and four-quarter-ahead forecasts of the changes in nominal GDP,
the rejection rates were greater than twelve, ten, and eleven percent respectively. In an earlier paper,
Bonham and Cohen (1992) rejected the null hypothesis of unbiasedness at the 5% signiﬁcance level
for 40% of the eighty survey respondents in their sample of contemporaneous price forecasts. The
corresponding fraction of rejections for the one-quarter-ahead forecasts was 50%.
These results are consistent with our ﬁnding of widespread rejection of micro-homogeneity. A sig-
niﬁcant number of individual respondents to the Survey of Professional Forecasters do not produce
unbiased predictions of the ﬁve series studied here, and the micro-homogeneity tests show that their
forecasts diﬀer systematically. Furthermore, rejection of micro-homogeneity suggests that parameter
estimates in consensus unbiasedness regressions are likely to be inconsistent or lead to false acceptance
of the unbiasedness hypothesis. Therefore pooled estimates may suﬀer from heterogeneity bias and thus
do not represent a viable alternative to consensus estimates.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
This paper investigates the usefulness of panels of survey forecasts for testing the unbiasedness prop-
erty of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis. Survey data may be used in individual, consensus, or
pooled regression speciﬁcations. Although these data are most commonly used in “consensus” form, a
number of authors have criticized this speciﬁcation for introducing at least two kinds of bias. Figlewski
and Wachtel (1983) argued that aggregation of individual-rational forecasts may lead to parameterUniversity of Hawaii Economics Dept Working Paper: No. 00-3R 27
estimates which are inconsistent due to private information bias, and Keane and Runkle (1990) argued
that averaging individual-irrational forecasts may lead to false acceptance of the unbiasedness hypoth-
esis. The literature has turned to the pooled speciﬁcation in an attempt to avoid these two sources of
bias. However, Zarnowitz (1985) argued that pooled unbiasedness parameters are inconsistent, due to
constant cross-sectional realizations.
We show that the criticisms of consensus and pooled speciﬁcations are only valid when forecasts and
realizations are stationary. When these series are integrated and cointegrated, the criticisms break down
asymptotically provided micro-homogeneity obtains. Thus, micro-homogeneity is a crucial condition
for the validity of both consensus and pooled tests of the unbiasedness hypothesis. Because micro-
heterogeneity is a source of bias in both the consensus and pooled speciﬁcations, the attempt to avoid
aggregation problems by pooling is misguided. While a few authors have conducted tests for poolability,
we are unaware of any work which recognizes this close relationship between the presence of aggregation
bias in consensus regressions and heterogeneity bias in pooled regressions.
To conduct such tests we extend Zellner’s (1962a) micro-homogeneity test to the case of Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation and adapt a weighting matrix suggested by Keane and Runkle
(1990), which accounts for the possibility that forecast errors follow moving average processes both
individually and across respondents. We show that micro-homogeneity does not hold for forty-three out
of ﬁfty-three or eighty-one percent of the SPF’s forecasts of nominal GDP, the GDP deﬂator, real GDP,
real consumption expenditures, and real nonresidential investment over various forecast horizons, sample
periods, and minimum response levels. Thus, at least for these forecasts, unbiasedness should only be
tested at the individual level. The ten nonrejections of micro-homogeneity tend to be associated with
shorter forecast horizons, forecaster experience (i.e. a higher minimum response level), and the decade of
the 1980s. (Five of the nine nonrejections are for various tests of nominal GDP forecasts.) Therefore, for
these forecasts, consensus and pooled speciﬁcations may be used in testing the unbiasedness hypothesis.
Since individual-rational expectations imply micro-homogeneity in the panel, rejection of micro-
homogeneity implies some degree of bias in the panel forecasts. Thus, we expect that individual un-
biasedness tests will also produce rejections. Indeed, we reject individual unbiasedness in anywhere
from 24% to nearly 93% of our individual regressions. Studies by Zarnowitz (1985), Batchelor and Dua
(1991), and Bonham and Cohen (1992) conﬁrm our ﬁndings and provide evidence of both widespread
bias in professional forecasts and considerable micro-heterogeneity. These ﬁndings imply that agents
make use of diﬀerent private and/or public information when forming their predictions. Therefore, re-28 February 2000
search on expectations formation is best directed at understanding individual behavior. To date, there
has been some preliminary work devoted to identifying the traits of individual forecasters that explain
the quality of their forecasts. (See, e.g., Lamont 1995.) Further work in this area might examine whether
unbiasedness is related to forecast experience. We might conjecture that those respondents with the
largest number of observations and the highest percentage of nonmissing observations are most likely to
pass individual unbiasedness tests. Finally, it is important to note that we have also found evidence that
some forecasters do produce unbiased forecasts, despite the diﬃculty of uncovering the “true” DGP for
any series.
Given that the percentage of individual rejections of unbiasedness we report for nominal GDP ranges
from about 24% to 36%, depending on the forecast horizon, it may seem almost anomalous that the
marginal signiﬁcance levels for all of our full sample micro-homogeneity tests reported in Table 1 are
virtually zero. Further work might also examine how much variation in individual coeﬃcients is re-
quired to reject micro-homogeneity. In addition, we would also expect the marginal signiﬁcance level
of the pooling test to be aﬀected by the speciﬁcation of the variance-covariance matrix. For example,
accommodation of cross-sectional heteroscedasticity may reduce the power of the test to such a degree
that micro-homogeneity cannot be rejected, even if it does not hold in the population.
Finally, we suspect that the failure of micro-homogeneity in tests using panel data is widespread.
For example, Pesaran and Smith’s study of dynamic labor demand functions concludes (1995, p. 25):
“Ourexperienceisthat[thehypothesisofmicro-homogeneity]isalmostalwaysrejected....Thelesson
for applied work is that when large T panels are available, the individual micro relations should be
estimated separately ....” The implications for the usefulness of panel data are telling. When speciﬁ-
cations generally prevent accommodation of individual heterogeneity, as for example, when testing the
unbiasedness hypothesis, achieving large T is much more important than achieving large N. For the
same reason, a large N cannot serve as a substitute for a signiﬁcant number of missing observations in
each individual time series. This points to the need for incentives to ensure the long-term retention and
consistent reporting of survey respondents.
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APPENDIX A: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LS CONSENSUS(ˆ βC) AND POOLED (ˆ βP)
ESTIMATORS
Case 1: At+h and Pi,t are stationary
Dietrich and Joines (1983) derived the algebraic relationship between LS pooled ( ˆ βp) and consensus
(ˆ βc) estimators. Speciﬁcally, they wrote the two estimators as ˆ βc = Numc
Denc and ˆ βp =
Nump
Denp and showed
that the numerators (Num) and denominators (Den) are related as follows:
Nump = N · Numc = N(
 T
t=1 At+hPc,t − T ¯ A ¯ P), (A.1)




i=1(Pi,t − Pc,t)2. (A.2)
In (A.1), ¯ A = 1
T
 T
t=1 At+h,a n d ¯ P = 1
T
 T
t=1 Pc,t. According to (A.1), the numerator of the pooled
estimator is N times the numerator of the consensus estimator. According to (A.2), the denominator of
the pooled estimator exceeds N times the denominator of the consensus estimator by an amount equal
to the sum over time of the squared within-period variation of the individual predictions around their
within-period mean. Thus, the pooled estimator is less than the consensus estimator, as long as there
is any cross-sectional dispersion in forecasts. Intuitively, for each constant realization in time period t,
cross-sectional dispersion of forecasts spreads out the scatter plot of the pooled regression observations
in the Pi,t direction. This tends to ﬂatten the pooled regression line, reducing its slope and increasing
its intercept, relative to the consensus regression line.
Case 2: At+h and Pi,t are integrated and cointegrated
In (A.1) and (A.2), multiply Nump and Denp by 1/T to convert sums of squares and cross-products




T can be shown to be O(T), imply-
ing that their ratio, ˆ βc,i sO(1), i.e. converges to a constant. This is the superconsistency result. On






i (Pi,t −Pc,t)2 is also O(1), i.e. of smaller order than both Numc
T and Denc
T . Hence, the inﬂu-
ence of cross-sectional dispersion on the diﬀerence between ˆ βc and ˆ βp becomes negligible asymptotically.University of Hawaii Economics Dept Working Paper: No. 00-3R 31
APPENDIX B: TESTING MICRO-HOMOGENEITY WITH SURVEY FORECASTS
The null hypothesis of micro-homogeneity is that the slope and intercept coeﬃcients in the equation of
interest are equal across individuals. This paper considers the case of individual unbiasedness regressions
such as equation (1) in the text, repeated here for convenience.
At+h = αi + βih Pi,t + hεi,t t =1 ,...,T (B.1)
and tests H0 : α1 = α2 = ...= αN,a n dβ1 = β2 = ...= βN. Following Keane and Runkle (1990), we
assume that for each forecaster i,
E[εi,t εi,t]= σ2
0 for all i,t,
E[εi,t εi,t+k]= σ2
k for all i,t,k such that 0 <k≤   + h,( B . 2 )
E[εi,t εi,t+k] = 0 for all i,t,k such that k> + h,
where h is the forecast horizon and   is the publication lag for the realization At+h. Thus, every forecaster
has the same T × T variance-covariance matrix Q, with elements: q(m − k,m)=q(m,m − k)=σ2
k for
k ≤   + h,a n d0o t h e r w i s e .
Similarly, for each pair of forecasters i and j we assume
E[εi,t εj,t]= δ2
0 for all i,j,t,
E[εi,t εj,t+k]= δ2
k for all i,j,t,k such that 0 <k≤   + h,( B . 3 )
E[εi,t εj,t+k] = 0 for all i,j,t,k such that k> + h.
Thus, every pair of forecasters has the same T×T cross-covariancematrix R with elements r(m−k,m)=
r(m,m−k)=δ2
k,f o rk ≤  +h, and 0 otherwise. The complete variance-covariance matrix, denoted Ω,
has dimension NT × NT, with matrices Q on the main diagonal and R oﬀ the diagonal.
For most surveys, there are a large number of missing observations. Keane and Runkle (1990), Davies
and Lahiri (1995), and to the best of our knowledge all other papers which make use of pooled re-
gressions, have dealt with the missing observations using the same approach. The pooled or individual
regression is estimated by eliminating the missing data points in both the forecasts and the realization.
The regression residuals are then padded with zeros in place of missing observations to allow for the cal-
culation of own and cross-covariances. As a result, many individual cross-covariances are calculated with32 February 2000
relatively few pairs of residuals. These individual cross-covariances are then averaged. The assumption
of 2(k+1) second moments, which are common to all forecasters, is made for analytical tractability and
for increased reliability. When testing for micro-homogeneity, σ2
k and δ2
k are computed using residuals
from individual unbiasedness regressions. In contrast, Keane and Runkle (1990) computed σ2
k and δ2
k
using residuals from a pooled regression which imposes a micro-homogeneity restriction. (This spec-
iﬁcation of Ω is not the only one suggested in the literature. For example, Davies and Lahiri (1995)
propose a diﬀerent variance-covariance matrix which decomposes forecast errors into a common error
due to aggregate shocks and an idiosyncratic component.)
Stack all N individual regressions into the Seemingly Unrelated Regression system
A = Pθ + ε (B.4)











Each Pi =[ ιP i]i saT × 2 matrix of ones and individual i’s forecasts, θ =[ α1 β1 ...α N βN] ,a n dε is
an NT ×1 vector of stacked residuals. The vector of restrictions, Rθ = r, corresponding to the null hy-



























and r is a 2(N − 1) × 1 vector of zeros. The corresponding Wald test statistic,
(Rˆ θ − r) [R(P
 P)−1P
 ˆ ΩP(P
 P)−1R ](Rˆ θ − r), is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square random
variable with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions, 2(N − 1).University of Hawaii Economics Dept Working Paper: No. 00-3R 33
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